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Abstract 
 
It has long been recognized that the resilience of any system, whether human or natural, 
involves the capacity of that system to adapt its structure, although not necessarily function, 
to a new configuration in response to long-term socio-ecological change. Thus over the 
long-term, enhancing resilience involves more than simply improving the ability of a system 
to resist an immediate threat or recover to a stable, past state. However, despite the 
prevalence of adaptive notions of resilience in academic discourse, it is apparent that 
infrastructure planners and policies largely continue to struggle to comprehend longer-term 
system adaptation in their understandings of resilience. Instead a short-term, stable system 
perspective (STSS) on resilience is prevalent: our purpose here is to identify and 
problematize this perspective. In so doing, we present research that developed a heuristic 
‘scenario-episode’ tool to address, and challenge, this STSS perspective as it plays out within 
the context of UK infrastructure resilience. Thus, our goal is to help resilience practitioners 
better understand the capacities of future infrastructure systems to respond to natural and 
malicious threats.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Resilience is often conceptualized as a long-term adaptive, transformative process, (Adger, 
2000; Coaffee et al, 2009; Holling, 1973; Manyena, 2006; Paton et al, 2000). Adaptive 
conceptualizations of resilience have been maintained across many fields: from ecologists 
seeking to understand the impact of past climate change events on the potential of corals to 
survive future climate change (Pandolfi, 2003), to psychologists seeking to understand how 
childhood is formative in equipping individuals to adapt to future stress (Richardson, 2002). 
Regarding physical infrastructure systems, it is increasingly recognised that, whilst they can 
never be totally resistant, they should be designed in a manner that allows for recovery of 
their structure and function following a catastrophic event (Bosher and Dainty 2010; 
Coaffee et al, 2009). And yet the structure and function of infrastructure systems is far from 
static over the longer-term. Historical studies reveal how physical infrastructure systems, 
whether transport (Guldi, 2012) or energy (Hughes, 1983), have evolved over decades in 
unpredictable ways as they respond to, and further shape, socio-ecological changes. In the 
context of critical infrastructure planning, including emergency response
1
, policy debates 
remain largely silent on the capacity of infrastructure systems to adapt to longer-term socio-
ecological changes. Instead, infrastructure resilience policy and planning has become largely 
orientated around a short-term, stable system (STSS) perspective. In essence, STSS 
perspectives focus on how a known socio-technical system (e.g. electricity grid) can either 
resist an immediate short-term threat (such as a bomb or flood), or else rapidly bounce back 
                                                          
1
 In keeping with UK policy, we regard emergency response as a critical infrastructure system in its own right 
(Cabinet Office, 2011: 12).  
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from that threat to an original, equilibrium state (see e.g. Cabinet Office, 2010; Cabinet 
Office, 2011; Xu et al, 2012; Maliszewski and, Perrings, 2012).  
 
In this paper we aim to identify and problematize the prevalence of STSS perspectives of 
resilience as related to infrastructure. We argue that this enables a better understanding of 
the relationship between open-ended adaptations in infrastructure systems in response to 
longer-term socio-ecological changes, such as climate or economic change, and the short-
term capacity of infrastructure systems to resist and recover from immediate, often well-
known, threats. Thus, in this paper we address two related questions: (i) what are the 
limitations of the STSS perspective, and (ii) how can scholars and practitioners address the 
limitations of this perspective as a basis for improving resilience in specific contexts. The 
contributions we propose are conceptual and methodological: to evaluate the conceptual 
and methodological value of a heuristic tool to elicit new debates around the resiliency 
implications of infrastructure changes. To this end, rather than offering prescriptive 
recommendations of how resilience practice should be enacted (which is beyond the scope 
of this paper), we discuss policy interventions derived from this approach to develop 
conceptual and methodological arguments and illustrate the shorter-term implications of 
long-term events. 
 
After introducing some of the key conceptual debates around ‘infrastructure’ and 
‘resilience’ that inform the analysis of this paper, the first section reviews the significance, 
and by extension limitations, related to the STSS perspective within current resilience policy 
and planning. This section will refer to global resilience policies, but will focus on UK 
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infrastructure resilience policy and planning as a detailed case study. However, we recognize 
that simply critiquing the existence and potential consequences of temporal, and 
conceptual, myopia, within current critical infrastructure planning leaves the limitations of 
the STSS perspective unaddressed for practitioners. For this reason, in the second section of 
the paper we outline an alternative way of framing infrastructure resilience. Here, a novel 
heuristic method informed by scenario methodologies and to help practitioners capture the 
consequences of longer-term, open-ended adaptations within critical infrastructure 
resilience for their resilience work, organisations and policies is presented. Drawing upon 
the parlance of Holling (1973, 2001), we term this approach the ‘socio-ecological’ 
perspective. In the third section of the paper we evaluate the utility of this heuristic method 
to elicit new policy-relevant insights into resilience that enable longer-term changes and 
adaptations to become foregrounded. Here we discuss a multi-disciplinary research project 
in which this methodology was recently employed as an aid to better understand future UK 
infrastructure resilience, specifically in the key infrastructure areas of energy and transport. 
By way of conclusion we briefly examine the wider value and transferability of this approach 
to a range of resilience practitioners, as well as possibilities for further research in this area. 
Before proceeding further it is important to clarify how two terms that will be repeatedly 
mobilized within this paper to frame the research problem are being understood: 
‘resilience’ and ‘infrastructure’.   
 
1.2 Framing Resilience and Infrastructure 
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One much-cited (see Folke, 2006; Manyena, 2006; Walker and Cooper, 2011), and 
elucidating, definition of resilience, germane to the focus of this paper, is that proposed by 
the ecologist C.S. Holling. In a seminal paper, Holling (1973) explained how system 
behaviour can be understood through two disciplinary lenses: engineering and ecology. In 
an engineering system the parts of system must perform consistently within a narrow, 
stable range of measurable variables. For example, an electricity grid must transmit energy 
at a particular frequency. Any deviation from such narrow performance goals must be 
counteracted. By contrast, in an ecological system, where external threats are often 
unknown, systems can be understood through less defined qualitative relationships; for 
example, focusing on the survival of a species in the eco-system, rather than numbers of a 
species. Holling (1973) describes the ecological model as a better basis to conceptualize 
resilience because if the persistence of relationships is what guarantees the survival of a 
system – rather than the avoidance of temporary oscillations in that system’s performance – 
then resilience does not equal stability. Consider the example of an energy grid. The 
resilience of the electricity grid is not the same as its stability. Resilience requires that the 
qualitative relationship between various parts of the network are maintained (e.g. coal 
power stations are linked through a coal supply chain to a coal seam, then linked to 
consumers via a transmission network composed of control centres, pylons and sub-
stations). Here, resilience constitutes more than simply the constant operation of the 
system in terms of set frequency and voltage. Indeed, without the perseverance of such 
qualitative functional relationships, quantitative system stability and structural integrity 
cannot even be measured. Holling is not suggesting here that quantitative stability is not 
important, rather that it is not sufficient in itself to understand, and achieve, resilience. 
Holling (1973) also observes how systems appear more resilient to change by virtue of their 
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instability; insects in forests with high climatic variability suffer immense population shifts, 
but recover well. Insects in areas of low climatic fluctuation recover far less well. We could 
similarly hypothesize that areas of the world with highly unstable energy networks promote 
better recovery and adaptation to power loss within a human population than highly stable 
infrastructures.  
 
More recently, Holling (2001; and Holling et al., 2002) has refined his ideas through the 
‘panarchy’ model of change in socio-ecological systems. This cycle contains two phases: the 
long and slow accumulation of resources for conservation and transformation by the system 
and shorter periods of innovation and reorganisation. In the first phase, stability, 
connectedness and rigidity in the system increase; yet this also increases the vulnerability of 
the system to change. In the second phase, an external event exposes this vulnerability 
causing rapid systemic disorganisation where new relationships are unexpectedly formed, 
sowing the seeds of future renewal.  Holling (2001) argues that during the first stage, 
systems at different temporal scales are mostly immune to changes at lower scales, so that, 
for example, a single decision in a company does not influence national law. Yet, there are 
opportunities for cross-scale interaction, for example when this law is too rigid and 
eventually fails during the second stage, a single decision could influence its renewal. 
Additionally, larger scales can also release stabilizing influences on smaller scales as they 
break down, releasing learnt behaviours to constrain the renewal of smaller, faster systems 
(Holling, 2001).     
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Holling’s (1973; 2001) work has two important implications that help us challenge an STSS 
perspective on resilience. First, Holling’s (1973) early work draws a useful distinction 
between resilience and stability and reveals an important relationship between the two. 
There can be no quantitative system stability without qualitative resilience. Yet, qualitative 
resilience does not require quantitative system stability and, indeed, for Holling, 
quantitative system stability may actually weaken resilience. We should add an important 
clarification at this juncture: we are not proposing that system stability and reliability is 
undesirable. Rather, we should contextualize this STSS perspective, via Holling (1973), to 
suggest that short-term stability should never be the end-goal of resilience thinking, as it 
obscures the adaptive, open-ended, nature of systemic resilience.  Second, Holling’s (2001) 
later work suggests that all systems adaptation is endemic, albeit over different time 
frames. However, we cannot grasp adaptation in any system without acknowledging the 
complex interactions between different adaptive cycles of different (yet related) systems 
operating across varying temporal and spatial scales. In other words, any attempt to 
understand resilience purely through an isolated single system and its temporal (and spatial) 
scale will obscure our understanding of the broader resilience innovations and constraints. 
Holling’s socio-ecological notion of resilience fundamentally challenges the STSS perspective 
found in notions of resistance, reliability and recovery in much current resilience policy and 
planning (see Cabinet Office, 2010; 2011; UN, 2005; Patriot Act, 2001).  
 
Another key term addressed here is ‘infrastructure’. This term can be refined in relation to 
the physical and organisational assets required not simply to maintain the normal running of 
a nation-state, but whose loss would bring about significant, long-term, socio-economic 
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deterioration in that state. This is the domain of critical infrastructure. Numerous definitions 
of critical infrastructure exist in policy documents. Arguably the most significant is that 
within the 2001 US Patriot Act: 
 
The term ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ means systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters  
(Patriot Act 2001: P.L. 107-56). 
 
 
This is the established US definition and has been translated into other policy documents 
worldwide, including the UK: 
 
Those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the continued 
delivery and integrity of the essential services upon which the UK relies, the loss or 
compromise of which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to 
loss of life (Cabinet Office, 2010: 8). 
 
Such broad policy definitions inevitably pose more questions than they answer. Specifically, 
how do the various organisations involved in the planning, maintenance and protection of 
infrastructure understand what is ‘critical’ and what is not (CRS, 2004; Manyena, 2006)? 
While policy habitually narrows down critical infrastructure to specific sectors (see Cabinet 
Office, 2010; Patriot Act, 2001), governments often ask private sector organisations to 
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maintain lists of critical infrastructure in conjunction with government agencies (such as the 
Office of Infrastructure Protection (US) or Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (UK)).  In the case of the US, some reports have challenged the accuracy of 
these lists, as different public and private bodies disagree over the criticality of assets (CRS, 
2004: 16). In many respects such ambiguity is unavoidable, as mapping critical assets in fast 
changing infrastructure systems, especially in sectors like ICT (Information Communication 
Technologies), would be impossible to fully determine (CRS, 2004). Nevertheless, it is 
important to note the problems defining and mapping current critical infrastructure 
resilience, when considering the challenge posed here of thinking about critical 
infrastructure resilience over the longer-term.  
  
In the next section we will examine how critical infrastructure resilience is currently being 
defined, understood and addressed, across three scales of policy and practice: first, global 
definitions of resilience; second, UK critical infrastructure policy documents; and third, 
emergency planning events. Taken together, analysis of these scales reveals the prevalence 
of the STSS view in contemporary resilience practice, especially in relation to critical 
infrastructure. Following Holling (1973, 2001), we argue that a key problem here is that such 
perspectives both overlook the potential and challenge of adaptation that is common to all 
systems, and downplay the interactions between systems and their scales that constitute 
resilience.   
 
2. Resilience Today: Temporal and Conceptual Myopia in Policy and Practice  
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Some of the most significant definitions of resilience in current international policy 
discourse are contained in the documents produced by the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). In 2005 the Hyogo Framework for Action: Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (HFA) was produced by the UNISDR, 
supported by the General Assembly through UN resolution 60/195, setting out an ambitious 
plan to improve global resilience to natural and human-induced hazards (UN, 2005). The 
HFA offers a set of guiding principles and practical means to increase global resilience up to 
2015. The HFA defines resilience as: 
 
 
The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to 
adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social 
system is capable of organising itself to increase this capacity for learning from past 
disasters for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures (UN, 
2005: 4).      
 
 
While superficially similar to the definition of resilience proposed by Holling (1973, 2001), 
the HFA definition diverges significantly. Notably, the HFA does not admit the capacity for 
adaptation to be engendered through the creative destruction of a system. Also, there is no 
mention of how resilience might be induced through the interaction of multiple systems, 
changing over different spatial and temporal scales. Rather, it appears, and contra Holling 
(2001), that adaptive resilience usually occurs as a single, isolated system becomes more 
robust and resists change. Holling (1973; 2001) denies this possibility: a more stable, rigid 
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system is always less resilient and more vulnerable. Holling (2001) contends that the 
adaptive resilience of any system must be understood alongside other systems.  However, 
while challenging the mutual exclusivity of stability and resilience proposed by Holling 
(1973, 2001), the HFA definition does suggests that resilience may also occur through 
adaptation and change. In effect, the HFA defines resilience in a manner that both 
encapsulates and diverges from Holling (1973, 2001). However, as the guidance begins to 
detail more specific advice for particular systems, and especially as related to infrastructure, 
it shifts noticeably away from change towards resistance as a model of adaptive resilience. 
This excerpt on how to implement critical infrastructure resilience evidences this shift: 
 
Protect and strengthen critical public facilities and physical infrastructure, 
particularly schools, clinics, hospitals, water and power plants, communications and 
transport lifelines, disaster warning and management centres, and culturally 
important lands and structures through proper design, retrofitting and re-building, in 
order to render them adequately resilient to hazards (UN, 2005: 11). 
       
The HFA is an important document that supports the efforts of both front-line practitioners 
and governments working to improve resilience across the world (Manyena, 2006). 
However, viewed against Holling’s (1973, 2001) understanding of resilience, the HFA could 
be characterized as myopic both conceptually, through its emphasis on stability, and 
temporally, through its focus on adaptation in single systems adapting over short time-
scales to immediate hazards. To understand how national governments have aligned their 
policies with the HFA, and by extension instituted its short-term, stability orientated 
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approach to resilience, especially in the field of infrastructure, we will now turn towards UK 
resilience policy. 
 
The UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) recently defined resiliency as the process 
through which “assets, networks and systems anticipate, absorb, adapt to and/or rapidly 
recover from a disruptive event” (Cabinet Office, 2011: 15). This process has been sub-
divided into four elements: “resistance; reliability; redundancy; response and recovery” 
(Cabinet Office, 2011: 15, see also Cabinet Office, 2010). In the case of infrastructure, the 
CCS defines a measure of resilience as security of the supply of a service, particularly within 
critical national infrastructure (Cabinet Office, 2010: 7). The CCS prioritizes critical national 
infrastructure (CNI) as central to societal resiliency, wherein the “loss or compromise of 
which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life” (Cabinet 
Office, 2010: 8). Nine critical infrastructures have been defined by the Cabinet Office: 
finance, health, food, government, emergency services, transport, energy, communications 
and water (Cabinet Office, 2011: 12). These descriptions of critical infrastructure resiliency 
are broadly in keeping with those of other nations, for example the US (see NIAC, 2009).  
 
Significantly, these understandings of ‘resilience’ focus on short-term, system stability thus 
repeating the same STSS notion of resilience as the HFA. This is evidenced in at least two 
ways. First, there is an emphasis on recovery back to a stable system, with change being 
treated as the threat to the system, rather than a possible mode of resiliency in itself. This is 
apparent in the four-fold definition of ‘Resilience’ from the CCS (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
Notions of ‘Resistance’, ‘Redundancy’ and ‘Reliability’ do not suggest the possibility of 
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change and adaptation. Rather, they point to the possibility of rendering a system more 
robust to any change. The fourth element, ‘Response and Recovery’, might be expected to 
contain the possibility of adaptive structural change. However, CCS policy indicates 
otherwise, instead defining this feature as purely the “ability, capacity and capability to 
respond and recover from disruptive events” (p17). Secondly, there is a focus within the CCS 
on the probabilistic measurement of anticipated risk in the short-term, despite the founding 
principles of the CCS to engage with unfamiliar, longer-term events (Smith, 2003). For 
example, the CCS conducts an on-going National Risk Assessment, from which a declassified 
National Risk Register (NRR) is published. The NRR is produced to aid different organisations 
in improving their resilience across the four CCS resilience elements, including participation 
in emergency training and exercises, as is compulsory for all governmental front-line 
organisations under the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. Notably, the horizon of the NRR is 
limited to five years.  
 
While some may dismiss such international and national resilience policy as little more than 
rhetoric, we can also find evidence that this STSS view of resilience is consequential within 
practices linked to resilience, for example UK emergency planning exercises. Such exercises 
provide an authoritative setting through which future ‘resilience’ is rendered 
comprehensible and actionable to practitioners with a stake in protecting critical 
infrastructure systems. Given the policy discourse on resilience, it is unsurprising that recent 
ethnographic research into UK emergency response exercises has revealed a deliberate 
focus on ensuring plausibility (see Anderson and Adey, 2011). This strategy permits only 
minimal changes in infrastructure contexts from the current status quo and relatively well-
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known hazards to be used within exercise scenarios: “They anchor the interval of 
emergency in `realistic' details that resonate with players' tacit and codified knowledges of 
the area, the exercised event, and response behaviour” (Anderson and Adey, 2011: 1100). In 
other words, UK emergency planning exercises appear more or less predicated on an STSS 
view of resilience.  
 
While this STSS orientation towards resilience is no doubt beneficial as a means of testing 
the efficacy of current procedures, assets and policies (Anderson and Adey, 2011; Crichton 
et al, 2009; Shapiro, 1995), it will likely obscure both any notion of resilience as being 
formed through open-ended change and cannot address the interaction of changes in 
different systems evolving over different spatio-temporal scales. For Holling (1973; 2011), 
this process is crucial to the adaptive persistence, and transformation, of countless natural 
and social systems.  Tellingly, we are not aware of any emergency planning exercises in the 
UK or elsewhere that have examined the unpredictable impact of long-term changes in 
infrastructure on immediate emergency response. Given this lacuna in resilience policy and 
practice, we now describe a heuristic tool that may be deployed to overcome the limitations 
of STSS perspectives on resilience in current resilience policy and practice.  
 
3. The Resilient Futures Project: Towards a Socio-Ecological View of Resilience 
 
3.1. Methodology 
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Scenario methodologies (Borjeson et al, 2006; Schwartz, 1996; Shearer. 2005; Varum and 
Melo, 2010) offer an important contribution to mobilising Hollingian socio-ecological 
concepts of resilience, especially as related to critical infrastructure.  Scenarios have an 
established role in the planning and development of the built (and un-built) environment 
(e.g. Harty et al, 2007; Mokrech et al, 2012; Reginster and Rounsevell, 2006; Shearer, 2005). 
However, scenario techniques are seldom used to understand how future infrastructure 
systems, including emergency response itself, might, variously develop over the long-term, 
to promote or inhibit resilience. We can discern at least five barriers in examining the 
longer-term adaptive cycle of infrastructure change within resiliency planning: (i) the short-
term nature of political election cycles; (ii) the emphasis on immediate return on investment 
within private and public infrastructure operators and owners; (iii) the unpredictability of 
infrastructure change, especially in sectors such as ICT (iv) the lack of institutional legitimacy 
for long-term perspectives on resilience; and (v) the absence of available tools and 
techniques capable of addressing such issues.  While both (i) and (ii) are major obstacles in 
addressing any long-term policy issues, (iii), (iv) can, as examined below, be addressed 
through the development of (v). This section describes such a tool.      
 
Between 2010 and 2013 the EPSRC Resilient Futures research project (see Resilient Futures, 
2012) developed, and stress-tested through multi-stakeholder engagement, energy and 
transport orientated scenarios for 2050, each with radically divergent configurations of 
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infrastructure. The Resilient Futures scenarios
2
 are explorative rather than predictive or 
normative: they are intended to explore possibilities for future changes in energy and 
transport infrastructure, in response to long-term drivers (such as climate change), rather 
than predict specific changes or offer a roadmap for responding to change (see Borjeson et 
al., 2006: 727). Importantly, these future infrastructure scenarios were not simply discussed 
by stakeholders to evaluate their general resiliency attributes. They were also stress-tested 
through the introduction of event-episodes in industry focus groups that functioned as 
quasi-emergency planning exercises. This twin-fold evaluation of the scenarios, both in 
static (as examined in semi-structured interviews) and more dynamic terms (as examined 
when scenarios were stress-tested by episodes within multi-stakeholder focus-groups), 
enabled us to capture any tensions between individual notions of their expected resiliency 
and the dynamic resiliency attributes that are only made manifest when practitioners work 
through an unfolding event. Moreover, by linking together longer-term, unpredictable 
changes in infrastructure development with short-term emergency response, our scenario-
episode tool challenges the STSS perspective of resilience, wherein short-term, system 
stability frames all resilience strategies.  
 
Drawing upon, and developing, existing futures methods (see Borjeson et al., 2006; 
Schwartz, 1996), we developed our scenarios and episodes in consultation with a wide 
group of stakeholders: high-level public and private sector practitioners with a stake in the 
resiliency of UK transport and energy infrastructure (this user-group has chosen to remain 
                                                          
2
 For some, the use of scenarios here is inconsistent with their original meaning. Shearer (2005: 74), for 
example, makes a distinction between snapshots of alternative future and scenarios as pathways to that 
future. Despite such concerns, the definition of scenarios employed here is consistent with its use in many 
scenario studies in the infrastructure field and hence is the term most familiar to our user-group.  
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anonymous given the highly confidential nature of their work).  This process involved a 
seven-step procedure in which we constructed scenario-episodes to examine energy and 
transport infrastructure resilience in the face of natural and malicious hazards (this 
methodology is described in full in Sircar et al., 2013). We deployed the procedure for 
Resilient Futures as follows: 
 
1. Review of extant infrastructure-related scenarios (listed in full in Sircar et al., 2013). 
2. Distil two primary drivers for system adaptation from existing studies to create scenario 
axes.  
3. Cross-reference features from extant scenarios to conduct a PESTEL analysis to identify 
basic scenario characteristics. 
4. Refine and populate scenario details drawing on interview data with key stakeholders. 
5. Develop narratives of the four future infrastructure scenarios. 
6. Develop episodes to stress test scenarios. Conduct further interviews with different key 
stakeholders to check the plausibility of the episodes alongside the scenarios. 
7. Deploy and evaluate integrated scenario-episode narratives within multi-stakeholder 
focus groups. 
 
3.2 Outcomes 
 
During stages one and two of the above process we identified a series of drivers for 
infrastructure change at a variety of geographical scales: 
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• Uncertain impact of global climate change  
• Growing global energy insecurity driven by transition from fossil fuel economy  
• Growing global fuel and transport poverty caused by increasing global energy costs  
• Growth of BRICS
3
 nations  
• Ageing population in UK  
• Population growth in UK 
 
All of these drivers will likely induce an adaptive cycle of conservation and transformation in 
current energy and transport infrastructure systems. However much uncertainty remains  
regarding the precise response to such drivers for change. Major explorative futures studies 
(IPCC, 2000; Foresight, 2006; 2008) have identified broad areas of possible infrastructure 
changes:  
 
• The balance of infrastructure decentralization/independency versus 
centralization/interdependency. 
• The extent to which social prosperity is presaged by greater technological 
innovation, including reciprocal infrastructure investment.  
 
                                                          
3
 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
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These ambiguities over infrastructure change were translated into the differentiating axes 
of infrastructure uncertainties that, in turn, served to guide the production of the four 
Resilient Futures scenarios (see Figure 1).  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Differentiating variables and values for these scenarios were generated through a PESTEL 
(Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal) analysis of the scenario 
reports in Table 1. A full description of this analysis is provided in Sircar et al., (2013).  
 
This PESTEL analysis produced short scenario narratives (see Sircar et al., 2013) which were 
then validated by a focus group of experts (n=7) from the fields of infrastructure planning 
and resilience. The participants at this focus group formed the steering group for the project 
and would later form a key end-user group for outputs from the research.  The scenarios 
were then refined through a series of semi-structured interviews (n=29) conducted with a 
targeted sample of infrastructure planners and managers in energy and transport, spanning 
private and public organisations, including those with a specific interest in infrastructure 
resilience (Sircar et al., 2013). This group was asked three broad sets of questions: 
 
1. How would the energy and transport systems operate in a healthy way? 
2. How will the energy and transport systems relate to one other? 
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3. What are the potential resilience strengths and weaknesses of each scenario? 
 
The interview process was organised so that at least five interviewees discussed each 
scenario to ensure parity of coverage; however interviewees were able to consider any 
number of the four scenarios. The first two groups of questions were designed to elicit more 
information to further refine the scenario narratives. The third group of questions explicitly 
related to resiliency issues.  
 
While asking practitioners general resiliency questions about a particular infrastructure 
scenario is a valuable way for practitioners to consider the variegated ways infrastructure 
systems may adapt to threats over the long-term (and thus promote a socio-ecological 
understanding or resilience), it has limitations. In particular resilience stakeholders are 
unable to consider how they might respond to an unpredictable and unfolding event within 
a specific scenario. And thus practitioners will tend to consider the resiliency of a scenario as 
being socially and geographically isomorphic: all people in all areas in scenario are identified 
as being more or less resilient in these general ways. While such general statements may 
offer useful starting points for moving discussion beyond an STSS perspective, they lack a 
level of precision about the different effects of hazards on different populations and regions 
which is demanded in understanding the complexities of resilience (Manyena, 2006).  
 
In order to address such limitations, our tool includes stress-testing of the resiliency 
features of the scenarios through the development of threat episodes. Two episodes were 
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generated that sought to engage with the maximum number of stakeholders. To aid 
comparability, the episodes adopt a similar starting point in each scenario, but resonate 
slightly differently within each setting in order to attenuate their implications and 
understand their impact within the differing contexts. A final consideration was the 
importance of engaging participants: episodes were developed that were plausible 
(Anderson and Adey, 2011) yet were also sufficiently extreme to stress-test infrastructural 
features of the scenarios. This challenging process was empirically informed through the 
analysis of official investigations of past natural (Katrina Report, 2006) and malicious events 
(9/11 Commission Report, 2004; 7/7 Coroner’s Report, 2011), and was validated through 
interviews with security practitioners (n=4). The final narrative involved a compound and 
developing crisis event in which a natural hazard episode (a tidal flood event) is followed 
(and compounded) by a malicious hazard episode (a terrorist attack on a power station). 
 
3.3 Integration of Scenarios and Episodes 
 
After the completion of the scenario and episode development, focus groups were 
conducted (n=5 per group) for each of the four scenarios to help understand the on-going 
resiliency implications of future infrastructure changes. The use of focus groups to inform 
the development of scenarios is not new (Borjeson et al, 2006; Cairns et al, 2010; Goodier et 
al, 2010; Schwartz, 1996). However, in this instance, the focus group participants were 
explicitly told to immerse themselves in the scenario rather than to question, validate, or 
develop them. The focus groups were comprised of stakeholders in various sectors related 
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to critical infrastructure across national, regional and local scales, within private and public 
sector organisations. This immersion process was facilitated through the development of an 
animated presentation that introduced a selection of qualities attributed to the scenario in 
question. Each focus group effectively functioned as a future emergency response exercise. 
After the presentation and a brief discussion regards points of clarification, the first episode 
was immediately (verbally) introduced. Participants were asked to describe how the various 
agencies in each scenario were likely to respond to this episode, and importantly how the 
communities affected would respond. After this initial discussion regarding the recovery 
process, the second episode was then introduced. The surprise introduction of new threats 
during an emergency response exercise is an established technique, where the “aim is to 
stimulate the fog of an incident” (Adey and Anderson, 2011: 2891). It also enabled the 
cumulative and cascade impacts of natural and human-induced events to be evaluated. The 
participants were then asked how they would respond and how this event would influence, 
affect or inhibit the on-going recovery process and future infrastructure function. After this 
discussion a larger focus group with all participants (n=20) from the four separate focus 
groups was conducted wherein the differing resilience features of each scenario were 
compared, contrasted and discussed as a group in more detail. This discussion also included 
some reflection upon different notions of resilience.   
 
4. Discussion: re-thinking resilience in socio-ecological terms 
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All of the interviews and focus groups were recorded, transcribed and coded (using a 
hierarchical coding approach in QSR Nvivo 8), wherein the operation and resilience 
strengths and weaknesses of the infrastructure systems in each scenario could be analysed, 
including specific emergency response behaviours.  Indicative results of this process are 
illustrated in Table 1 below: 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The future scenarios approach described here is intended as a means of moving beyond the 
STSS view of resilience which underpins much extant resilience policy and practice. More 
specifically, we propose that our heuristic tool will mobilise calls for socio-ecological 
understandings of infrastructure resilience (e.g. Holling 1973; 2001) and inform current 
policy and practice (for example emergency planning exercises). In this approach 
infrastructure practitioners should be prompted to unpack the interactions between 
systems of infrastructure (e.g. transport, energy, emergency response) evolving on much 
longer adaptive cycles, and thus question the sole focus on quantitative structural stability 
expressed in notion of robustness, reliability and hardening as the end-point of resilience. 
Findings from the Resilient Futures research exercise illustrated opportunities and 
challenges in developing this approach.  
 
The first stage of the application of the tool involved a review extant future studies of 
infrastructure (see Table 1). All of these studies suggested various drivers that will induce 
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adaptations in current infrastructure configurations over the long-term. While these reports 
tend to stress the uncertainty in the response of infrastructure to such drivers, they 
challenge the STSS assumption that the modus operandi of thinking about resilient 
infrastructure systems necessarily corresponds to ensuring their short-term, stability. An 
extract from The Powering our Lives futures report (Foresight, 2008), illustrates how the UK 
Government Office for Science has previously acknowledged how future adaption in 
infrastructure to drivers such as climate change will have varied resiliency implications: 
 
In the Carbon Creativity scenario there are also large scale engineering solutions for 
resilience, such as higher flood defences and larger diameter drainage pipes, 
exploiting new, lower-carbon, concrete technologies…. In the Resourceful Regions 
scenario, the rise of geopolitical concerns and a dwindling of trust are allied with a 
strong role for regions to respond to local vulnerabilities and exploit local resources. 
Smart metering is imposed in many regions to reduce the risk of outages (Foresight, 
2008: 148).  
 
These two scenarios were not defined around their infrastructure configuration; instead 
they were differentiated on the basis of purely of the level of openness and 
interdependences in societies, as they respond differently to global drivers for change such 
as climate change and energy security. Notably, these Foresight scenarios mirror those 
proposed by the emissions scenarios developed by the United Nations Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), wherein the effects of climate change could either foster 
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local or global responses, and concomitant levels of infrastructure centralisation and 
integration (IPCC, 2000). However, while evidence exists that, at least in the UK, 
governments show some acknowledgement of the adaption of infrastructure over the long-
term and its resiliency implications, this work is not cited within any key policy documents 
on UK resilience (see for example Cabinet Office, 2010; 2011). Such detachment is perhaps 
hardly surprising given that UK resilience policy has largely been framed as a response to 
perceived short-term failings such as those experienced after the 2007 summer flooding 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). Moreover, the Powering our Lives report is not focussed on 
infrastructure resiliency, but rather sustainability in the built environment. And yet other 
Foresight reports, such as the Intelligent Infrastructures scenarios (Foresight, 2006), which 
do focus on infrastructure change, remain similarly detached from long-term resiliency 
thinking.   
 
During the refinement and testing of the Resilient Futures scenarios with stakeholders, we 
encountered many examples of the resiliency implications of long-term infrastructure 
adaption that could inform policy formulations. For example, one interviewee, a transport 
systems expert, analysed the Local Power for Local People scenario, and suggested that 
active modes of transport could encourage greater adaptation of urban transport 
infrastructure to localized flooding: 
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You’re not getting stuck, you know, in a whole line of traffic that can’t go anywhere 
… is walking and cycling inherently more resilient than using vehicles of some 
nature? I guess it is in some ways. 
 
Thus, we can start to appreciate how response and recovery, one of the four ‘Rs’ of 
resiliency concerns of the UK cabinet office (see Cabinet Office, 2011), might be encouraged 
in a practical manner by planning for more cycle lanes and pedestrian friendly highways. 
Such ideas were elaborated in other interviews. For example, another interviewee, again 
with an expertise in transport, questioned the limitations of this idea:  
 
if it was saying walking and cycling were the main forms of passenger transport then 
we need to do some fairly radical things. Fairly radical things would have to happen 
for resilience to be a big problem, although a heavy snowfall might be such a feature, 
clearly walking and cycling becomes more difficult when there is heavy snowfall. 
 
Conversely in such a highly localised infrastructure scenario the amount of redundancy 
would clearly be reduced. For example, as communities became more reliant on single-
sources of electrical power, instead of being able to easily share power across a national 
grid.  Several interviews and focus groups noted this point in relation to both of the localised 
scenarios (High-Tech Hamlets, and Local Power for Local People). The full implications of this 
lack of redundancy were captured in one of the focus groups stress-tests for Local Power for 
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Local People, where one respondent explained how: “the thing is, in this world everything is 
essential”. Or, as another respondent put it: 
 
In this one, they inevitably will suffer a lack of resilience because of small scale. 
Eventually you get down to the fact that you only need one of something because 
you are so small and so if that one that has an issue, you have had it. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this conceptually and methodologically orientated paper to discuss 
the policy implications of such issues. The important point we stress here is that such 
discussions were being elicited from practitioners following the method described in section 
three. One research subject, with a background of high-level engagement with the UK 
government on infrastructure policy, made this point forcibly to us during interview: 
 
when you hear Government Ministers talk about resilience, what they mean is how 
do you build in increased resilience around our existing infrastructure, around a 
pattern of infrastructure we’ve got today, not how do we re-engineer the 
infrastructure to build in resilience and, for me, there’s a massive difference there, 
massive difference, they just want to take the existing system, they’re extrapolating 
the existing system out for ‘x’ decades.  
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I think that’s the opportunity you’ve got here is to take away any of the comfort 
factors they may still have about how to increase resiliency in infrastructure systems 
and infrastructure maintenance, because that way there’ll be much more creative 
thinking about what we need to do.  
 
We do not intend the heuristic tool presented here to provide detailed policy descriptions. 
To repeat an earlier point, the tool presented here is not intended to offer predictive or 
normative scenarios that could form the basis of policy prescriptions. Rather we simply aim 
to elicit explorative debate and discussion around the significance of longer-term adaptive 
cycles in existing infrastructure, in response to various drivers, and then assess the shorter-
term resiliency implications of these changes. In provoking these discussions, we of course 
recognize that policymakers are involved in making investment decisions now that will 
shape future infrastructure change, especially given the long life-cycle of energy and 
transport infrastructure assets, and thus these scenarios might elicit discussion which could 
inform whether current decisions are framed as being even connected to resilience. One 
interviewee explained how: 
 
The government has a big pot of money to invest for 2050, let’s make sure that the 
allocation of that capital is designed against a whole set of upstream resiliency 
issues, not simply factored in against an old way of looking at energy infrastructure. 
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The Resilient Futures research exercise also helped practitioners identify trade-offs between 
different aspects of resilience, as related to infrastructure change. For example, a scenario 
where infrastructure is more independent and de-centralised might aid response and 
recovery by encouraging greater self-sufficiency. Yet such isolated communities may suffer 
from a lack of redundancy in energy production because energy is not shared so readily. In 
other words, while greater infrastructure decentralisation and independence may prevent 
regional cascade failures from localised events such as flooding, and thus enhance national-
level resilience, it can increase vulnerability within communities to such events. The notion 
that increased community independence actually upscales resilience is we argue a 
fascinatingly counter-intuitive issue that requires further examination.  
 
Such insights have important implications. Current definitions of resilience, such as those 
offered by the UK Cabinet Office and the UNISDR, tend to view different concepts of 
resilience as mutually compatible. However, discussions in our focus groups and interviews 
identify important trade-offs to consider when focussing on different dimensions, and 
indeed scales, of resilience (e.g. increased community resilience may inhibit national 
resilience). This especially applies when considering the implications of long-term 
adaptations in infrastructure systems. Many of these trade-offs, and interactions between 
different spatio-temporal scales of resilience, are captured in Table 1. In conceptual terms, 
the Resilient Futures approach proved highly successful in helping practitioners consider 
how infrastructure systems, such as energy and transport infrastructure, may adapt across 
long-term cycles. The approach also revealed how such adaptation might induce and 
constrain changes in other infrastructure systems with shorter and smaller adaptive cycles, 
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such as emergency response practices.  In this regard we suggest these insights correspond 
well with Holling’s socio-ecological understanding of resilience. However, it was notable that 
our tool was less successful in addressing interactions in the other direction: how changes in 
micro-scale emergency response in turn influence macro-scale infrastructure planning. This 
bias towards descending rather than ascending cross-scale interplay may be partly explained 
by the static use of the scenarios in the episode focus groups: once the scenarios had been 
refined through interviews they served as static contexts for the episodes to play out, 
inhibiting discussion of how they might develop in the future. Some possibilities to address 
this limitation are outlined at the end of this paper.    
 
5. Concluding Comments 
 
The Resilient Futures project has developed and tested a novel ‘scenario-episode’ tool to 
address future infrastructure resilience in socio-ecological terms. Our approach thus rejects 
the idea, popular in future studies that adaptation is, as De Jouvenel (2000: 40) argues, 
antithetical to the notion of strategic planning. Adaptation is not purely a passive attitude 
towards the future, as in ‘waiting to see what happens and adapt to it’. Rather, it can also be 
strategically anticipated, evaluated and enabled in different ways within particular 
infrastructure policies. This point thus also confounds any binary categorical distinction of 
resilience into proactive or reactive modalities (see Coaffee et al 2009: 132). The distinction 
between proactive and reactive modes of resilience is well-rehearsed in resiliency debates: 
proactive modes correspond to macro-scale (temporal and spatial), strategic infrastructure 
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planning and reactive modes to micro-scale recovery and adaptation.  Rather uniquely, 
findings from the use of our approach by practitioners suggest how micro-scale reactive 
resilience can be proactively influenced by macro-scale decisions and future framings of 
various agencies in the present (see Section 4, and especially Table 1). This insight is directly 
in accord with Holling’s (2001) adaptive cycle model, where cross-scale interplay is integral 
to the self-organization, and indeed resilience, of any system. However, as Folke (2006) 
suggests, the implications of this cross-scale (both spatial and temporal) interplay are often 
underplayed within current resilience policy. In addressing this omission, we do not here 
seek to provide precise policy recommendations; rather we suggest the efficacy of a 
heuristic tool intended to help address such limitations. And thus, we seek to directly extend 
the full implications of Holling’s theory of resilience from academic to policy analysis, as 
opposed to simply conceptualizing its potential (as in Folke, 2006; Manyena, 2006)  
 
We advocate this tool not simply because of its capacity to capture the resiliency 
consequences of the interaction between different systemic scales, but also because in so 
doing we problematize many long-held assumptions found with STSS thinking, from the 
tendency to assume all notions of resilience are mutually compatible to the wide-spread 
conflation of system stability and resilience. As shown above, such concepts remain 
pervasive across government policy (Cabinet Office, 2010; 2011; Patriot Act, 2001; UN, 
2005), as well as academic analysis (Xu et al, 2012; Maliszewski and, Perrings, 2012). 
Nevertheless, this tool is not intended to replace all current resilience approaches. Indeed, 
STSS thinking is unavoidable when considering short-term resiliency policy and practice (see 
Anderson and Adey, 2011; Crichton et al, 2009; Shapiro, 1995). However, the exclusive 
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application of such thinking to elucidate the resiliency of longer-term urban and regional 
planning in areas like infrastructure is, as we have implored to stress, highly problematic.  
 
In order to further refine this tool a later phase of the Resilient Futures scenarios will inform 
a subsequent series of complex computer models that will allow user-specific interactions 
with the scenarios. Therefore, for example, the specific agency of a particular domain (e.g. 
rail network maintenance) can be incorporated, and technical interdependencies can be 
modelled as complex causal relationships rather than simply relayed within a workshop 
setting of diverse participants. This later phase will involve the construction of a suite of 
interactive computer-based simulations through which different users, spanning different 
temporal and spatial scales, from infrastructure planners to emergency responders, can 
examine how their decisions might impact upon the resilience of infrastructure systems, 
communities, and individuals. Importantly, this complexity modelling will provide additional 
scope to address how micro-scale interactions in emergency response may have on-going 
effects on longer-term infrastructure planning, thus addressing ascending as well as 
descending cross-scale interplay. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough 
outline of this on-going work; however it is important to recognize that such future 
simulation would be impossible without the initial development of this ‘scenario-episode’ 
approach through engagement with end-users, an approach that has already yielded 
valuable insights for practitioners into the socio-ecologies of future infrastructure resiliency.   
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